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SUMMARY Japanese Silk Road Diplomacy, launched in 1997 by Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, was to become one of the first interna-
tional diplomatic initiatives appealing to the connectivity and revival of 
the Silk Road within Central Asia (CA). Subsequently, Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi dispatched a “Silk Road Energy Mission” in July of 
2002, launched the “Central Asia plus Japan” region-building initia-
tive in August 2004, and visited CA in 2006. Most recently, Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe visited all five CA states in 2015. Collectively, 
these initiatives demonstrate that CA is Japan’s latest “frontier” in Asia, 
where its  presence can be further expanded. For CA states, Japanese 
involvement in the region represents an attempt to balance Russian and 
Chinese engagements, while offering access to the technologies and 
knowledge needed to upgrade their economies’ industrial structures.
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Introduction
In recent years, the term “Silk Road” has been 
appropriated by the Chinese Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). Consequently, any reference to 
the Silk Road now carries the connotation of the 
Chinese penetration of and engagement with 
Central Asia (CA) and beyond. However, one of 
the first countries in East Asia that applied the 
Silk Road notion to its diplomatic initiatives in 
CA was Japan.1 The Japanese usage of Silk Road 
has since been repeated by the United States, 
which proposed the Silk Road Strategy Act of 
1999 to expand US presence in the region, and 
also by Russia to sustain its regional dominance. 
South Korea subsequently launched a number 
of similar strategies in 2009–13 under the “Silk 
Road” umbrella to connect the country to energy 
and other resources in Eurasia through Russia, 
China, and CA railroad networks.2 India, Iran, 
Turkey, and other countries have also undertaken 
various such initiatives, all of which demonstrate 
the international environment and contested nature 
of CA engagement in which Japan operates. 
Japan has since solidified its presence in 
CA and contributed significantly to regional 
development through its Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). But for various reasons, this 
remains in the shadows of Chinese infrastruc-
ture construction projects (BRI and construc-
tion of “land bridges” from China to Europe 
through the CA region as well as exports of CA 
natural gas and oil from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
and Turkmenistan) or Russian initiatives (the 
Eurasian Economic Community, which implies 
the creation of a customs and economic union). 
With the focus on Japanese foreign policy in 
CA, this paper aims to clarify the following issues. 
First, it attempts to explain the process of the con-
struction of the Japanese diplomatic initiatives in 
the CA region in historical perspective. Second, 
this paper highlights the strengths and weaknesses 
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of the Japanese approaches to regional issues and 
problems. And third, this paper sheds light on the 
areas to which Japanese policymakers and experts 
need to pay attention in their efforts to make the 
Japanese engagement in this region more efficient.
Evolution of the Japanese Silk Road Narrative
There are significant expectations on the part of 
CA governments and the public with respect to 
Japan. For CA states, Japanese involvement in the 
region represents an attempt to balance Russian 
and Chinese engagement while offering access 
to the technologies and knowledge they need to 
upgrade their industrial base. The public percep-
tion of the Japanese influences on CA states is 
generally positive. According to the AsiaBarometer 
survey conducted by the University of Tokyo in 
autumn of 2005, the highest ratings of the influ-
ence of Japan on their country (“good” and “rather 
good”) registered in Kazakhstan (10.4 percent and 
30.3 percent, respectively) and Uzbekistan (15.9 
percent and 36.3 percent, respectively). Similarly, 
a poll conducted in 2015 by the Japanese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) prior to the autumn 
visit of Prime Minister Abe to CA demonstrated 
that the sympathy toward Japan registered in 2005 
has sustained for 10 years, with the majority of 
respondents considering their country’s relations 
with Japan to be good (Uzbekistan 79 percent, 
Tajikistan 56 percent, Kyrgyzstan 52 percent, and 
Kazakhstan 59 percent) or rather good (Uzbekistan 
13 percent, Tajikistan 24 percent, Kyrgyzstan 
23 percent, and Kazakhstan 42 percent).3
Such sentiments can be attributed to the fact 
that CA states never had issues related to the impe-
rial history of Japan, as seen in Japanese relations 
with East Asian countries. They associate Japan 
not with imperialism but rather with technological 
progress, proper manners, and the years of ODA 
commitments in the onset of the CA states’ inde-
pendence. Such sympathy toward Japan leads to 
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expectations of larger Japanese foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and corporate participation as opposed 
to ODA disbursements. In addition, Japan is con-
sidered as an alternative to the Chinese and Russian 
projects, offering smaller CA states some alternatives 
to the countries feared for their potential for polit-
ical and economic exploitation and domination. 
Japanese diplomacy initiatives in the last 25 
years following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
aimed to rediscover this latest Asian frontier for 
Japan and establish a Japanese presence in this 
region. Japanese Silk Road Diplomacy, launched 
in 1997, has become one of the first international 
diplomatic initiatives appealing to the connectivity 
and revival of the Silk Road. This was under-
taken under Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s 
administration. Hashimoto’s understanding of this 
region had been informed by the Obuchi Mission4 
and Hashimoto’s interactions primarily with 
Russia. Despite launching the Silk Road/Eurasian 
Diplomacy, Hashimoto never traveled to CA and 
the Caucasus, which partly reflects the focus of 
Japanese foreign policy toward the United States, 
defined by its strategic alliance with it; toward 
China, due to Japan’s economic commitments to it; 
and toward Russia, with Japan oriented to resolving 
territorial disputes with it. Such a foreign policy 
agenda constrained Japanese prime ministers’ visits 
and did not leave much space for other regions, 
including CA. The Obuchi Mission traveled to 
Russia, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan from June 28 to July 9, 1997.5 While 
the mission focused extensively on Russia, it also 
provided some ideas on how to approach CA.
Hashimoto called for a needed “push to enlarge 
the horizon of our foreign policy” beyond the Asia 
Pacific, rediscovering a new Asian frontier, of which 
CA republics and the Caucasus constituted a large 
part.6 Hashimoto hoped to integrate Japan and CA 
states into a network of interdependence through 
the Japanese corporate community’s participation in 
resource exploration in this part of the world. For 
Hashimoto, the areas of interaction included, first 
and foremost, assisting these states in establishing 
affluent, prosperous, domestic systems under a new 
political and economic structure. Second, Japan 
aimed to utilize the great potential of these states 
to serve as bridges to create distribution routes 
within the Eurasian region. In terms of particular 
directions, Japanese Silk Road Diplomacy pri-
oritized three areas of concern: political dialogue; 
economic cooperation, including cooperation 
for natural resource development; and coopera-
tion in peace-building, nuclear nonproliferation, 
democratization, and fostering stability. The ODA 
assistance commitments of Japan in the CA region 
increased from US$ 2.57 million in 1993 to US$ 
24.227 million in 2003, a tenfold increase in 10 
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Table 1. Japanese ODA offered to the countries of Central Asia on a bilateral basis by 
country (in millions US dollars)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Uzbekistan 30.92 40.16 63.22 99.75 60.02 29.60 70.29 64.53 41.92 34.08 31.26 26.25 56.49
Kazakhstan 43.93 30.13 136.27 134.34 69.68 28.19 55.39 56.63 63.38 30.56 19.79 30.89 36.99
Kyrgyz Rep 23.15 8.12 31.23 26.69 20.95 17.22 15.69 12.49 18.06 23.50 30.99 19.98 17.87
Tajikistan 4.61 26.96 4.77 6.58 9.93 8.04 9.43 8.06 26.24 43.42 35.59 32.98 26.66
Turkmenistan 16.42 11.37 6.80 2.22 0.13 0.62 0.38 0.57 1.15 1.55 1.27 0.53 0.56
Source: Compiled from the data made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Seifu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) 
Kunibetsu de-tabuku 2014 (Chuou ajia/kokasasu chiiki), [Official Development Assistance By-country Data-book 2014  
(Region of Central Asia and Caucasus)], Tokyo, Japan, available at  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000072593.pdf (last accessed on July 15, 2015).
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years. Eventually, by the same year, the accumu-
lated ODA disbursements bilaterally to the CA 
and Caucasus states reached US$ 1.98 billion.7
Japanese Region-Building Initiative in Central 
Asia
In terms of the principles of engagement, Prime 
Minister Hashimoto emphasized establishing 
trust, establishing a mode of “mutual benefit,” 
and “maintaining a long-term perspective.” These 
areas and directions were largely inherited by 
subsequent Japanese administrations in their 
approaches toward the CA region. Attempts 
to establish Japan in the CA region have con-
tinued after Hashimoto’s departure from office. 
 The most notable among the successors 
of Hashimoto was Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi, who pushed forward the most ambi-
tious regional institution-building in CA by first 
dispatching a Silk Road Energy Mission in July of 
2002 to promote closer energy cooperation with 
the CA states.8 It is useful to note here the impor-
tance of the energy resources of CA for Japan. 
Discursively, exploration of energy resources (to 
include rare metals, oil, and gas) always featured 
as an important pillar that Japan framed in its 
attempt to diversify from its energy dependency 
on the Middle East. However, the importance of 
energy supplies from CA have been overstated due 
to logistical problems related to delivering these 
resources, which include, but are not limited to, 
the region’s geographically distant location and 
the regional states’ lack of access to seaports, all of 
which prevent construction of a proper infrastruc-
ture for delivering CA energy resources to Japan. 
Also, in terms of geopolitical location, coun-
tries that are sandwiched between CA states and 
Japan (China, Russia, and South Korea, to name 
a few) cannot be considered Japan-friendly in 
terms of their foreign policies, thus making it 
more difficult to construct energy-related infra-
structure from CA to Japan. Thus, although this 
theme has featured prominently in the 2006 “Arc 
of Freedom and Prosperity” speech by Taro Aso, 
then minister for foreign affairs, and during Abe’s 
2015 visit to CA (in particular in Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan), the rhetoric of the impor-
tance of energy resources to Japan largely remains 
in the realm of rhetoric and does not produce 
much in terms of tangible outcomes. The few 
examples of practical results of cooperation include 
the Kazakhstan-Japan agreement on the joint 
exploration and use of mineral resources, which 
coincided with a radical decrease in the supply 
of rare metals from China to Japan following a 
2010 boat incident between the two countries.9 
This agreement supported previous corporate 
plans, such as those signed by Japan’s Kansai Electric 
Power Company (KEPCO) with Kazatomprom 
and contracts between Itochu and Kazatomprom to 
develop uranium deposits. According to the terms 
of this contract, Kazakhstan could provide up to 
25 percent of the Japanese demand for uranium 
within the next decade. Similarly, following the 
visit of Abe to CA a few contracts have been signed 
for participation of the Japanese companies in con-
struction of processing plants in CA (Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan in particular). However, these 
initiatives are not connected to transporting these 
energy resources to Japan but rather entail corpo-
rate participation of the Japanese companies in 
processing them for further export to China and 
other states.10 Thus, the discourse on the impor-
tance of using CA regional energy resources as 
an alternative source of energy for the most part 
represents wishful thinking as opposed to a realiz-
able and practical goal. The statistics on exports 
from CA to Japan and roadmaps explained below 
also demonstrate that energy resources do not fea-
ture prominently in the trade between this region 
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and Japan, further supporting the points above.
Emphasizing Japanese gains from ODA and 
the positive attitudes toward Japan, in March 2003 
a group of Japanese experts concluded that CA was 
a new “frontier” in Asia where Japanese presence 
could be further expanded.11 Later, in August of 
2004, Japan launched its “Central Asia plus Japan” 
Dialogue forum.12 Prime Minister Koizumi was also 
the first Japanese prime minister to visit the CA 
region, paying visits to the largest regional states 
of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2006. Koizumi’s 
region-building initiative has had both integrating 
and decolonizing aims. It aimed to empower smaller 
CA states so that they could deal with regional 
problems by regional means, while providing 
Japanese know-how and financing as an alternative 
to Russian and Chinese schemes. At the same time, 
adhering to Hashimoto’s spirit of open regionalism, 
the CA plus Japan initiative emphasizes that it was 
not created to hurt Chinese or Russian engagement 
in this region. This can be explained by the fact 
that Prime Minister Hashimoto in his Silk Road 
speech of 1997 called not only for the develop-
ment of closer relations between Japan and CA but 
importantly also for active engagement with Russia 
and China as new frontiers for Japanese foreign 
policy. Thus, the spirit of Hashimoto’s initiative was 
liberalist and aimed to expand cooperation into a 
broader Eurasia to include Russia and China. The 
same spirit is inherited by the following initiatives.
Koizumi’s efforts were also continued by 
Foreign Minister (and later prime minister) Taro 
Aso’s concept of “Central Asia as a Corridor of 
Peace and Stability,” which he considered to be 
a consistent part of the “Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity” in 2006. These initiatives involved 
incorporating the CA region into larger Japanese 
initiatives in the Middle East, along the five 
main areas of policy dialogue, intraregional 
cooperation, business promotion, intellectual 
dialogue, and cultural and people-to-people 
exchange as a backbone of these relations.13 
The search for a pathway into CA for Japan 
has continued under Prime Minister Abe with his 
2015 visit to the CA region, prioritizing function-
ality and practical outputs over the value-based 
approach. This shift may be due to a realization 
by Japanese leadership that, for CA, the process 
of democratization is a longer-term objective, 
and in the meantime, the economic opportu-
nities of cooperation need to be taken. 14
In addition, to frame his political agenda 
Abe announced a Japanese version of a Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2016, which largely 
echoed the US approach but emphasized coun-
tries like India, Australia, and the United States 
as partners in achieving Japan’s objectives.15 It 
remains to be seen whether this initiative is rel-
evant to Japan’s CA engagement. However, this 
initiative demonstrates Japan’s constant search 
for a new narrative of its engagement interna-
tionally, which can be framed as Japanese dis-
cursive responses to the Chinese BRI or Russian 
Eurasian Economic Union ideas, among others. 
Competitive Advantages of the Japanese 
Standing in Central Asia
There are certain features that Japan aims to use 
as its competitive advantage in approaching the 
CA region. First, Japan’s relative distance from the 
region, which is frequently interpreted as a weak-
ness due to logistical problems associated with 
reaching regional resources and markets, is some-
thing the Japanese government aims to use as a 
competitive advantage (when compared to other 
countries such as China and Russia). It allows the 
Japanese government to claim “selfless” commit-
ment to the region by suggesting that its distant 
geographic location prevents it from dominating 
and exploiting CA states. Such a claim of “altruism” 
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in CA engagement, whether genuine or perceived, 
is part of the discursive construction of competitive 
advantage with respect to other big players, such as 
China and Russia. Second, Japan aims to emphasize 
the decolonization mission of its regional institution-
building, exemplified by the CA plus Japan initiative. 
In doing so, the Japanese government emphasizes 
that this scheme was designed to encourage CA 
states to seek intraregional cooperation and ties 
with each other, while Japan would provide the 
technical and financial assistance needed to support 
such alliances. This objective of the CA plus Japan 
initiative is rooted in the legacy of Prime Minister 
Hashimoto’s Eurasian (Silk Road) Diplomacy. 
Third, Japan uses the duality implied by the 
universal and Asian features of its identity to 
advance constructive relations with CA states. 
One point to note here is that Japan is regarded 
in CA as being a modern society that in the past 
challenged the West but then became part of it 
without losing its traditional values, which appeals 
particularly to the Turkic and Muslim world that 
CA represents after being under Soviet rule and 
then in recent years facing potential Chinese eco-
nomic dominance. In addition, Japan does not 
completely abandon its commitment to universal 
values (such as democracy, a market economy, 
the safeguarding of human rights, and the rule of 
law) but also does not use them as a precondition 
for cooperation, offering CA states an opportu-
nity to adjust and build their domestic conditions 
for implementation of these universal values. 
For example, Prime Minister Koizumi was the 
first leader of a liberal democratic country to visit 
Uzbekistan in 2006 when the United States and 
other European nations were introducing sanctions 
against Islam Karimov’s government for excessive 
use of force and the eventual massacre of protesters 
in the city of Andijan in May of 2005. During 
the visit, Koizumi did bring up the importance of 
human rights but also expressed understanding of 
Uzbekistan’s developmental concerns and pledged 
unconditional developmental assistance. Thus, 
Uzbekistan, despite its poor human rights record 
has ever since been one of the top recipients of 
Japanese aid, which for the year 2016 reached 
38,898 million yen, constituting 73.8 percent of 
all the ODA assistance extended through the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to the 
countries of CA and the Caucasus (see table 1). 
Among regional states, Japan has ranked among 
the top five ODA providers for 2010–15, being 
the top provider of assistance for Uzbekistan, and 
ranging between the second and third top provider 
of assistance for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over the 
same period (see table 2 for overall disbursements).
A similar example of duality is the case of 
good governance and transparency in Japan’s ODA 
Among regional 
states, Japan has 
ranked among 
the top five ODA 
providers for 
2010–15
Table 2. JICA disbursements to Central Asia (in millions of YEN)
Source: Modified by author to include only countries of CA from JICA Activity Report, 2016, East Asia and Central Asia: 
Towards Sustained Economic Development through Strengthening Regional Connectivity and Diversifying Industries.
Total Value of JICA programs Composition ratio %
Uzbekistan 38,898 73.8
Tajikistan 3,349 6.4
Kirgiz Republic 2,948 5.6
Kazakhstan 155 0.3
Turkmenistan 22 0
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practices. Some Japanese companies, in particular 
Nihon Koutsu Gijyutsu (Japan Transportation 
Consultants)16 were caught paying bribes to Uzbek 
(and to Vietnamese and other states’) officials 
during the decision process for ODA disbursements. 
Although Japan condemned such practices,17 it 
nevertheless continued its ODA assistance without 
imposing punitive measures against the Uzbek 
government, again displaying a certain degree of 
understanding with respect to various problems 
of transition in CA. In this sense, such duality 
represents the pragmatism of the Japanese approach 
toward CA states and the Japanese understanding 
that the issues of governance and transparency can 
only be dealt with through constructively engaging 
CA states over the long term and not through 
sanctions or other punitive measures. As a channel 
for influencing the behavior of these states, Japan 
emphasizes human resource development, in line 
with which by 2014 Japan accepted 10,878 trainees 
from CA and the Caucasus and dispatched 2,603 
experts to these states.18 
Table 3. Japan's Assistance in the Central Asia (calendar year 2015, in millions US dollars)
Country Grants Loan aid Total 
(Net 
disburs.)
Total 
(Gross 
disburs.)
Grant aid Technical Total Amount Amount 
recovered 
(B)
(A)-(B)
Total Through 
multilateral 
institutions
Uzbekistan 6.50 - 6.19 12.68 141.46 27.48 113.98 126.66 154.15
Kyrgyz Rep. 33.79 6.12 8.72 42.51 - 0.39 -0.39 42.12 42.51
Tajikistan 14.21 3.87 3.61 17.82 - - - 17.82 17.82
Kazakhstan 0.36 - 1.34 1.70 - 34.93 -34.93 -33.23 1.70
Turkmenistan 0.06 - 0.46 0.52 - 1.81 -1.81 -1.29 0.52
Source: Modified by author to include only countries of CA from White Paper on Development Cooperation 2016,  
List of Charts Presented in the White Paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, available at  
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page22e_000816.html, last accessed on August 24, 2018.
Table 4. Central Asian countries’ exports/imports to and from Japan
Country Trade Japanese Companies 
in the CountryExport to Japan Import from 
Japan
Balance
2013
(in millions 
US dollars)
2013
(in millions 
US dollars)
2013
(in millions 
sUS dollars)
Uzbekistan 9.88 10.4 -0.54  -
Kazakhstan 53.73 67.71 -13.98  8
Kyrgyz Republic 0.1 9.15 -9.05  -
Tajikistan 0.81 1.55 -0.74  -
Turkmenistan 0.05 3.79 -3.74  -
Source: Compiled from the data made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Seifu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) 
Kunibetsu de-tabuku 2014 (Chuou ajia/kokasasu chiiki), [Official Development Assistance By-country Data-book 2014  
(Region of Central Asia and Caucasus)], Tokyo, Japan, available at  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000072593.pdf (last accessed on July 15, 2015).
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The Japanese direct investments and commit-
ments are less impressive, leaving a large potential to 
fulfill. The largest investments were made to economi-
cally larger and energy-resource-rich Uzbekistan (US$ 
900 million) and Kazakhstan (US$ 357 million) 
according to 2017 data. Japan largely exports to CA 
states machinery and industrial goods (13.56 billion 
yen to Uzbekistan, 30 billion yen to Kazakhstan, 
662 million yet to Tajikistan, and 2.4 billion yen to 
Kyrgyzstan) while it imports from them textile yarn, 
fabrics, and nonferrous metal (500 million yen 
from Uzbekistan), radioactive material and nonfer-
rous metals (141.1 billion yen from Kazakhstan), 
fruits, and non-metallic ware (163 million yen from 
Table 5. Typical scheme of actors involved in the inter-governmental economic cooperation 
committee scheme between Japan and Central Asia states
Source: Composed by author from interviews with officials in respected Central Asian governments.
Co-headed by the head of 
the Japanese corporations:
Mitsui Busan
Marubeni
Mitsui Shyoji. etc.
Vice Prime Minister 
Head of the Chamber 
of Commerce
Japanese Forum-type IGK
Japanese Trade 
Chamber
   ROTOBO         JICA      MOFA  Corporations
ROTOBO (Russian and NIS Trade Organization)
MOFA 
Itochu 
Shoji
Mitsui  
Bussan
Marubeni NisshinMitsubishi 
Shoji
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Tajikistan and 153 million yen from Kyrgyzstan).
In terms of major actors in these interactions, the 
intergovernmental committee on economic coopera-
tion between Japan and CA states is composed of the 
Japanese MOFA, Japan Association for Trade with 
Russia & NIS (ROTOBO), JICA, Trade Chamber, 
and representatives of the Japanese corporations.
The economic cooperation roadmaps pro-
duced by this intergovernmental committee 
mostly consist of the intergovernmental frame-
work agreements and mutual understanding 
memorandums and agreements regarding Official 
Development Assistance projects, mainly because 
the Japanese enterprises have not yet expressed 
an overwhelming commitment to involvement in 
projects in CA. The Japanese corporations remain 
rather passive in CA due to the concerns related 
to the protection of their prospective investments 
and governance practices, as demonstrated in the 
case of JTC mentioned above. Put into comparative 
perspective, in 2010 there were only 18 Japanese 
companies operating in Uzbekistan (demographi-
cally the largest country of CA) compared to 
410 Korean and 480 Chinese companies.19 This 
demonstrates both the weakness of the Japanese 
corporate presence in the region and the great 
potential that it may explore in the future.
Challenges and Tasks Ahead
There are a number of challenges that Japan still 
faces in approaching this region. First, the task 
of “defining” the importance and place of the 
CA region for Japan has been and remains one of 
Japan’s greatest challenges due to its relative dis-
tance from the CA region, which makes it more 
difficult for Japanese policymakers to frame this 
region’s importance for Japan in practical terms. 
While Japan always emphasizes the importance 
of Asia for its foreign policy, CA is not treated in 
There are a 
number of 
challenges that 
Japan still faces  
in approaching 
this region
line with Japan’s Asia policy. The vague status of 
the CA region for Japanese foreign policy is notably 
neither treated as a part of Japan’s Asia policy nor 
conceptualized as a region of its own. Foreign policy 
issues related to CA are being dealt with in the 
MOFA of Japan by its Central Asia and Caucasus 
Division of the European Affairs Bureau, rather 
than by its Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau. 
Second, this lack of definition of the importance 
of the region to Japan impacts the intergovern-
mental economic cooperation roadmaps of Japan 
with the CA regional countries. For instance, 
the 2017 roadmaps of Japanese cooperation with 
Uzbekistan (by far the most important country 
of CA for Japan) emphasize the Japanese com-
mitment to development of the country through 
its human capital development and large ODA 
disbursements. However, they do not clearly dem-
onstrate how the Japanese corporate community 
and the Japanese taxpayers benefit from Japanese 
engagement through implementation of these 
roadmaps. This then brings into question the sus-
tainability of the Japanese initiatives in this region. 
The third problematic area is the lack of con-
tacts between the political leadership of Japan and 
the CA states. While the frequency of interactions 
between the governments does not necessarily 
relate to the quality of those interactions, the cases 
of China and Korea demonstrate that increased 
frequency of interaction often results in particular 
projects. The Chinese and Korean heads of state 
and governments are frequent visitors to CA, while 
the leaders of Japan have visited CA only twice 
over the period of these states’ independence. Such 
lack of personal interaction does not contribute to 
the expansion of cooperation between these states. 
This then connects to the fourth issue for Japan in 
CA, which is the limited agenda of cooperation. As 
is demonstrated by recent economic cooperation 
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